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Abstract
Prevailing evaluations of fingerprint recognition systems
have been performed as end-to-end black-box tests of fin-
gerprint identification or authentication accuracy. How-
ever, performance of the end-to-end system is subject to
errors arising in any of its constituent modules, including:
fingerprint scanning, preprocessing, feature extraction, and
matching. On the other hand, white-box evaluations pro-
vide a more granular evaluation by studying the individ-
ual sub-components of a system. While a few studies have
conducted stand-alone evaluations of the fingerprint reader
and feature extraction modules of fingerprint recognition
systems, little work has been devoted towards white-box
evaluations of the fingerprint matching module. We report
results of a controlled, white-box evaluation of one open-
source and two commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) minutiae-
based matchers in terms of their robustness against con-
trolled perturbations (random noise and non-linear distor-
tions) introduced into the input minutiae feature sets. Our
white-box evaluations reveal that the performance of finger-
print minutiae matchers are more susceptible to non-linear
distortion and missing minutiae than spurious minutiae and
small positional displacements of the minutiae locations.
1. Introduction
The use of fingerprints in biometrics has seen a tremen-
dous growth over the past 20 years due to their purported
uniqueness, permanence, universality, and ease of collec-
tion [20]. As fingerprint recognition technology contin-
ues to see widespread adoption, the need to understand
and validate system recognition accuracy and robustness
is paramount [30]. Current methods for evaluating auto-
mated fingerprint identification systems (AFIS) consist, al-
most entirely, of end-to-end black-box testing.1 For ex-
ample, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) conducts fingerprint vendor technology evaluations
(FpVTE) [32] and the University of Bologna conducts fin-
gerprint verification competitions (FVC) ([1], [2]) to evalu-
ate fingerprint recognition systems on their operational per-
formance, as measured in terms of computational require-
ments and recognition accuracy. Black-box evaluations are
valuable in that they allow for overall comparisons between
state-of-the-art recognition systems in terms of performance
from the perspective of an end-user. However, this black-
box testing approach is limited in that it provides limited
information on which sub-module (image acquisition, pre-
processing, feature extraction, or matching) of the AFIS is
actually causing recognition failures (Figure 1).
To address this limitation inherent to black-box testing,
we aim to build upon recent studies that performed white-
box evaluations of individual modules of fingerprint recog-
nition systems [4, 5, 6, 17, 15]. To date, prior work in
white-box evaluations of AFIS have primarily targeted the
fingerprint reader and feature extraction modules. In par-
ticular, [4, 5, 6, 17] designed and fabricated 3D fingerprint
targets to evaluate fingerprint readers. Additionally, Chugh
et al. conducted a white-box evaluation of minutiae extrac-
tors by examining their robustness to controlled levels of
noise and motion blur [15]. A few studies have also at-
tempted a white-box evaluation of latent fingerprint examin-
ers, by quantifying discrepancies between manual markups
1White-box testing evaluates the internal sub-components of a system,
whereas black-box testing focuses on testing the end-to-end system using
inputs and outputs [10].
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Figure 1: Pipeline of a typical fingerprint recognition system: (1) finger-
print acquisition, (2) preprocessing, (3) feature extraction, and (4) match-
ing. While existing evaluations of recognition systems primarily consist
of an end-to-end black-box evaluation (i.e. all 4 modules simultaneously),
we propose an independent, white-box evaluation of the matching module.
Figure 2: Overview of the white-box testing of a minutiae-matcher. Input
minutiae sets are perturbed by random positional perturbations and non-
linear distortions. The perturbed minutiae sets are then matched to the
unmodified templates to generate similarity scores. Lastly, a measurement
uncertainty associated with each type of perturbation is computed, which
indicates a measure of robustness to that type of perturbation.
made by human experts [28, 29, 19]. Furthermore, Peralta
et al. conducted a survey to compare the performance of
top minutiae-based matching algorithms. Their work drew
conclusions between different matching algorithms using
various identification and authentication performance met-
rics on high quality fingerprint impressions [21]. Despite
these efforts, they did not address the effects of varying fin-
gerprint impression quality (i.e., impressions with extensive
non-linear distortion and other perturbations) on the recog-
nition performance.
It was shown in [15] that the position (x, y, and θ)
and quantity of minutiae identified varies between differ-
ent fingerprint minutiae extractors. However, the effects
of these variations on minutiae-based matchers have yet to
be studied. This work aims to evaluate the robustness of
different minutiae matchers to these slight perturbations of
minutiae location, orientation, and quantity (additional spu-
rious and missing minutiae). Additionally, non-linear dis-
tortion has been shown to effect the performance of fin-
gerprint recognition systems and many methods have been
proposed toward detecting and rectifying distortion in fin-
gerprint images [24, 14, 22, 23, 16]. Despite these efforts,
non-linear distortion remains a significant challenge in fin-
gerprint recognition [20]. Therefore, it is important that we
quantify and compare the effects of non-linear distortion on
various fingerprint minutiae matchers.
Given the lack of a standard, white-box evaluation of
fingerprint minutiae-matchers in the literature, we propose
a rigorous, repeatable white-box evaluation protocol com-
prised of the following steps:
1. Perturb a “ground-truth” minutiae-set by (i) random
translation and rotation shifts to the individual minu-
tiae, (ii) random minutiae additions and deletions, (iii)
combined random translation/rotation shifts and addi-
tion/removal of minutiae, and (iv) non-linear distortion
(thin-plate spline distortion model [11]).
2. Compare unperturbed “ground-truth” templates and
the perturbed templates to obtain similarity score dis-
tributions associated with each perturbation.
3. Compute an uncertainty measurement for each
matcher due to the perturbation techniques.
Our analysis aims to measure the robustness of var-
ious minutiae-based matchers against the induced minu-
tiae perturbations and reveal insights into the strengths of
the minutiae-based matchers, not previously revealed with
black-box testing. More concretely, the contributions of this
research are as follows:
1. A detailed white-box evaluation protocol and uncer-
tainty analysis of the fingerprint matching module.
This evaluation augments previous studies on white-
box evaluations of the fingerprint reader [4][5][6] and
feature extractor modules [15].
2. An analysis on the effects of random positional pertur-
bations and non-linear distortion on minutiae-matcher
performance.
3. Benchmarking three state-of-the-art minutiae-
matchers in accordance with our proposed protocol:
(i) an open source matcher (SourceAFIS) [31] and
(ii) two COTS matchers (Verifinger2 v10.0 and
Innovatrics3 v7.2.1.40).4
2. Evaluation Procedure
We conduct two main experiments in our white-box eval-
uation. First, we perform an uncertainty analysis resulting
from realistic amounts of non-linear distortion and random
perturbation of minutiae positions. The positional pertur-
bation parameters are taken from the experiment by Chugh
et al. of minutiae feature extractors on five live fingerprint
impression databases: FVC 2002 (DB1A and DB3A), FVC
2004 (DB1A and DB3A) and NIST SD27[15]. An uncer-
tainty analysis of the matcher module provides a measure
on the performance of the matcher in comparing ground-
truth minutiae templates with templates perturbed with var-
ious positional variations and distortion. An overview of
the analysis is shown in Figure 2. In an additional exper-
iment, we evaluate recognition performance of each minu-
tiae matcher on increasing levels of perturbation and distor-
tion.
2.1. Dataset for Experiments
The first step in the white-box evaluation of minutiae-
based matchers is to obtain ground-truth minutiae-sets. We
obtain the ground-truth minutiae-sets from fingerprints syn-
thetically generated using SFinGe [13]. We have generated
5,000 unique “master” reference fingerprints, each of which
is used to produce two synthetic impressions (Fig. 3).5
Thus, a total of 10,000 fingerprints are used (5,000 unique
fingers, 2 impressions per finger). For each of the 5,000
master prints that SFinGe generates, a ground truth minu-
tiae feature set is also output. It is these minutiae sets that
are fed as input to the fingerprint matchers for evaluation.
We utilize synthetic fingerprints because they provide re-
liable, consistent, ground-truth minutiae-sets. Otherwise,
obtaining ground-truth minutiae-sets from an operational
fingerprint dataset necessitates the use of minutiae sets ex-
tracted by the fingerprint recognition system’s feature ex-
tractor on noisy fingerprints, such as that shown in Fig. 3
(b). This defeats the paramount goal of a white-box evalu-
ation of the matcher, which is to evaluate the performance
of the matcher independent of the feature extractor (or other
sub-modules) used.
2.2. Perturbation Techniques
Given a ground truth minutiae feature set of n minu-
tiae {(x1, y1, θ1), ...,(xn, yn, θn)}, the next step is to per-
2https://www.neurotechnology.com/.
3https://www.innovatrics.com/.
4These two matchers are among the highest performing matchers in the
NIST FpVTE.
5Here master refers to the original binary print generated by SFinGe
prior to any distortion and/or noise that is introduced to produce realistic
looking fingerprint images.
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Example fingerprint images obtained from SFinGe synthetic fin-
gerprint generator. (a) A master print with ground truth minutiae; (b) a
realistic impression of the same fingerprint, derived from the master print.
form two types of perturbations: randomly generated po-
sitional perturbation and non-linear distortion. In partic-
ular, the minutiae perturbation techniques applied are: (i)
random positional (translational and rotational) shifts, (ii)
random addition and removal (spurious and missing) of
minutiae, (iii) combined random positional shifts and ad-
dition/removal of minutiae, and (iv) non-linear distortion.
These perturbation techniques are illustrated in Figure 4.
2.2.1 Translational and Rotational Shifts
It was shown in [15] that different fingerprint minutiae ex-
tractors will provide slightly different x, y, and θ values. It
is possible that these positional variations will have an im-
pact on the fingerprint matcher performance. Therefore, the
first perturbation technique involves random translation and
rotation applied to the x, y, and θ of each minutiae. In a
study on fingerprint uniqueness [35], Zhu et al. determined
that a given minutiae point’s position can be appropriately
modeled by a multi-variate Gaussian distribution. There-
fore, in keeping with established research, we use Gaussian
distribution models to assign random noise to the positions
and orientations of the fingerprint minutiae.
The mean, µ, and standard deviation, σ, parameters
of the Gaussian distributed translational (µp and σp) and
rotational (µo and σo) variations are taken from the lit-
erature [15]. In [15], a white-box evaluation of finger-
print feature extractors was performed on 3,458 real fin-
gerprint images aggregated from five different public do-
main databases: FVC 2002 (DB1A and DB3A), FVC
2004 (DB1A and DB3A), and the NIST SD27 rolled prints
database. In particular, the average translation and rota-
tion errors were obtained as the distance between the minu-
tiae locations provided by the automated feature extractor
and the manually annotated ground truth minutiae loca-
tions. These values were binned (into 5 bins) based upon
the NFIQ 2.0 [27] quality metric associated with the input
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 4: Illustration of the various minutiae perturbation techniques. For each image, the red circles denote the original minutiae locations and the blue
circles designate the minutiae locations following the perturbations. (a) The original, ground truth minutiae locations, (b) random positional shifts of x,
y, and θ, (c) removal of random minutiae points, (d) addition of random minutiae points, (e) combined positional and missing/spurious minutiae, and (f)
non-linear distortion of minutiae points.
Table 1: Parameter Values for Perturbations
Perturbation Technique Parameters
Positional Displacement
(Pixels, radians)
µp = 4.048
σp = 0.688
µo = 0.130
σo = 0.071
Missing Minutiae
(#Missing / #Ground Truth)
µm = 0.209
σm = 0.106
Spurious Minutiae
(#Spurious / #Ground Truth)
µs = 0.523
σs = 0.349
Non-Linear Distortion
(Eigenvector coefficient ci)
µd = 0.0
σd = 0.66
fingerprint to the feature extractor.6 Therefore, we take the
weighted average of these transformation parameters across
each bin (weights based on number of images in the bin) as
the mean and standard deviation for our models of Gaussian
distributed perturbation (Table 1).
2.2.2 Missing and Spurious Minutiae
A commonly occurring variation in minutiae feature sets
is the number of minutiae points identified in a fingerprint
image by various feature extractors. The number of de-
tected minutiae points can either be lower than ground-truth
(due to missed detections) or higher than ground-truth (false
detections). Therefore, our evaluation protocol takes into
account the effects of spurious and missing minutiae on
6The values assigned by the NFIQ 2.0 quality metric range from 0 to
100 and the ranges of the individual bins are [0, 20], [21, 40], [41, 60], [61,
80], and [81, 100].
Figure 5: Applying non-linear distortion fields (obtained from a statistical
model [26]) to an input fingerprint. Note, we show the fingerprint images
here to illustrate the effects of the non-linear distortion on fingerprint im-
ages. However, in the experiments, we directly apply the distortion field to
ground truth minutiae points provided by SFinge, eliminating the need of
a feature extractor for this white-box evaluation of the matcher.
minutiae-based matchers.
Similar to the previously discussed positional perturba-
tion technique, the distributions of missing minutiae and
spurious minutiae are modeled by Gaussian distributions
whose parameters are set as the expected value and variance
of the differences observed in the output of various feature
extractors [15]. As in [15], the mean and standard devia-
tion values are reported as a ratio of the number of missed
minutiae to the total number of ground truth minutiae in the
fingerprint image (Table 1).
2.2.3 Combined Random Perturbation
This perturbation technique involves aggregating the pre-
viously discussed techniques into one. This technique is
intended to show the combined effects of the positional per-
turbations and the presence of missing and spurious minu-
tiae, which is more representative of what a matching mod-
ule might reasonably be expected to receive from a feature
extractor.
First, we delete some minutiae points from the input
minutiae feature set as described previously, followed by
insertion of some spurious minutiae. Lastly, we apply the
translation and rotation perturbations. The missing minu-
tiae perturbation technique is first applied so that none of
the added spurious minutiae are deleted.
2.2.4 Non-Linear Distortion Model
The final perturbation technique applied to the input minu-
tiae feature set is that of an applied non-linear distortion
model proposed by Si et al. in [26]. We chose to apply a
non-linear distortion model (learned from actual distorted
fingerprints) as a perturbation to the minutiae points since
much of the perturbation of the minutiae points in an op-
erational scenario will be from distortion introduced by the
elastic friction ridge pattern on the human fingertip. Fur-
thermore, it is important to evaluate the robustness of a
minutiae-matcher against non-linear distortion since it has
been shown that hackers can obfuscate their own identity by
intentionally introducing a heavy distortion to their finger-
prints during the fingerprint acquisition process [26].
The non-linear distortion model proposed in [26] was
formulated and trained as follows. (i) A database of 320
distorted fingerprint videos was acquired. (ii) The minu-
tiae were then extracted from the first and last frame of
the video sequence. (iii) Correspondences were computed
between the minutiae from the first frame and the minu-
tiae in the final, distorted fingerprint frame. (iv) The cor-
responding minutiae points were used to estimate a dis-
tortion field di (grid) using the Thin-Plate-Spline (TPS)
model [11], which is commonly used to model fingerprint
distortion [23, 24, 16, 8, 7, 34, 9]. (v) Each distortion
field di was flattened into a vector and used to compute
a mean distortion field d¯. Subsequently, a covariance ma-
trix D was constructed. (vi) From the covariance matrix,
Principle Component Analysis (PCA) was used as a statis-
tical model to capture the variance of the training distortion
fields. Therefore, a new distortion field d can be generated
from a subset of t eigenvectors in accordance with Equa-
tion 1:
d ≈ d¯
i=t∑
i=1
ci
√
λiei (1)
where ci are the coefficients of the eigenvectors ei.
In our work, we select the coefficients ci of two eigen-
vectors (with the largest two eigenvalues) to generate new
distortion fields from a normal distribution with mean of 0
and standard deviation of 23 . Unlike in [26], these randomly
generated non-linear distortion fields are then applied di-
rectly to an unperturbed minutiae set rather than the fin-
gerprint image. Examples of fingerprints before and after
applying the non-linear distortion model are shown in Fig-
ure 5.
2.3. Uncertainty Analysis
We evaluate matcher performance on each of the given
perturbation techniques. Similarity scores between the orig-
inal fingerprint template and the perturbed template are
computed. From these scores, a total uncertainty is as-
signed to each fingerprint matcher chosen for the study. The
step-by-step procedure used to calculate the uncertainty of a
fingerprint matcher to controlled perturbations (random po-
sitional perturbations and non-linear distortions) is as fol-
lows:
1. Generate M = 10,000 Aref,k reference fingerprint im-
pressions (2 impressions from each 5,000 unique mas-
ter prints), 1 ≤ k ≤M .
2. Obtain M minutiae feature sets, Sref,k, from each
Aref,k.
3. For each Sref,k, synthesize N = 100 perturbed minu-
tiae sets, S′test,k,n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N .
4. Generate genuine similarity scores, sk,n, between
Sref,k and each S′test,k,n using the public-domain
minutiae matcher [31], COTS-A, and COTS-B.
5. Normalize the scores, sk,n, to be in the range of [0,1].
6. Compute the average, µk, of the sk,n scores using
µk =
1
N
∑N
n=1(sk,n)
7. Compute the standard uncertainty, uk, of Ak using
uk =
√
1
N
∑N
n=1(µk − sk,n)2
8. Repeat steps 1-7 for each reference feature set, obtain-
ing a uk for each Sref,k.
9. Compute the total uncertainty, umatcher, for the
matcher using umatcher =
√
1
M
∑M
k=1 u
2
k
This uncertainty calculation uses the Monte Carlo
method [3] for estimating uncertainties. It demonstrates
the sensitivity of a matcher to perturbations of its inputs.
A lower uncertainty score is better as it indicates better
robustness to the perturbations. To augment the findings
of the uncertainty calculation, we also compute genuine
and imposter similarity scores on the perturbed templates.
In other words, we obtain a distribution of genuine simi-
larity scores from corresponding (unperturbed, perturbed)
impressions and a distribution of imposter scores from
non-corresponding (unperturbed, perturbed) impressions to
evaluate the effects of the perturbation on recognition accu-
racy.
Table 2: Increasing Perturbation Parameters
Iteration Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Positional Displacement
(Pixels)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Missing Minutiae
(Missing Minutiae / Ground Truth)
0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 0.99
Spurious Minutiae
(Spurious Minutiae / Ground Truth)
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 max max max max
Combined Random Perturbation
(Pixel Displacement,
Missing Minutiae / Ground Truth,
Spurious Minutiae / Ground Truth)
5,
0.20,
0.5
10,
0.40,
1.0
15,
0.60,
2.0
20,
0.80,
1.5
25,
0.85,
max
30,
0.90,
max
35,
0.95,
max
40,
0.99,
max
Non-Linear Distortion
(std. dev. of eigenvector coefficients
ci with mean = 0)
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
Max refers to the maximum number of minutiae points (255) as allowed by the ISO minutiae template standard.
2.4. Recognition Accuracy vs. Perturbation
Here we discuss the experimental design for evaluating
the recognition accuracy of the minutiae-based matchers
on increasing levels of perturbation. For this experiment,
we select 2,000 fingerprint impression pairs from our syn-
thetically generated master prints. The experiment consists
of running eight iterations at increasing levels of perturba-
tion of each type (random positional shifts, random addi-
tion and removal of minutiae, combined random positional
shifts and addition/removal of minutiae, and non-linear dis-
tortion) and obtaining 2000 genuine and 50,000 imposter
similarity scores at each iteration (Table 2). Additionally,
for each perturbation type, the true acceptance rate (TAR)
at a constant false acceptance rate (FAR) of 0.01% is ob-
tained at each iteration to track the recognition accuracy vs.
perturbation amount.
3. Experimental Results
Using the synthetic fingerprint data set and perturbations
defined previously, we evaluate the effects of the various
perturbation techniques on the performance of each minu-
tiae matcher in the study. We examine the distributions of
genuine and imposter similarity scores before and after the
perturbations and calculate the uncertainty observed in each
of the minutiae matchers. Histograms of the genuine and
imposter similarity distributions for each minutiae matcher
following the modeled perturbations are shown in Figure 6.
The measurement uncertainties associated with each type of
perturbation are shown in Table 3. Finally, matcher recog-
nition accuracy vs. increasing levels of perturbation and
distortion are shown in Figure 7.
3.1. Effect of Random Perturbations
To analyze the effects of random perturbation (position
shifts and addition and removal of minutiae points), we
compare the genuine and imposter similarity scores of each
minutiae matcher before and after the applied perturbations.
Overall, we see that the mean of the perturbed genuine score
distributions are all significantly lower in value than the
mean of the unperturbed distributions. Among the random
perturbations, the shift in the mean is most pronounced due
to the combined perturbation, followed by random removal
of minutiae. Lastly, we note that there is a minimal impact
to the imposter score distributions. It is not surprising that
the imposter scores are minimally impacted since minutiae-
based matchers are fine-tuned for very low FAR, and thus
have very peaked imposter distributions centered around 0.
In general, we notice that the variance of the genuine
similarity distributions increases following the random per-
turbations. For each matcher, the largest increase in vari-
ance is seen with randomly removing minutiae, suggest-
ing that the effect of missing minutiae has a more unpre-
dictable and volatile impact on the performance of minutiae
matchers. This result agrees with a previous study that con-
cluded that missing minutiae has a greater effect than spuri-
ous minutiae on the Delaunay triangulation method for fin-
gerprint authentication [33]. One explanation may be that
certain minutiae contribute significantly more to the over-
all similarity score than others. Hence, the removal of such
significant landmark points could drastically effect the sim-
ilarity score produced by a minutiae matcher.
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Figure 6: Comparison on the effects of the combined random perturbations (translation/rotation shifts, missing minutiae, and spurious minutiae) and non-
linear distortion on the genuine and imposter similarity scores obtained from each minutiae matcher: COTS-A, COTS-B, and SourceAFIS. The green and
light-green distributions are the unperturbed and perturbed genuine similarity scores, respectively. The red and orange distributions are the unperturbed and
perturbed imposter scores (scaled by 0.1), respectively.
Table 3: Uncertainty Scores of Various Perturbations
COTS-A COTS-B SourceAFIS
Positional 0.001 0.001 0.001
Missing 0.009 0.007 0.005
Spurious 0.005 0.005 0.002
Combined 0.006 0.008 0.007
Distorted 0.029 0.025 0.028
Analysis of the uncertainty scores for each matcher due
to the various random perturbation techniques shown in Ta-
ble 3 indicates that missing minutiae and the combined per-
turbation model generate the greatest measurement uncer-
tainty. This agrees with the similarity score distributions
where we see the largest increase in variance due to the
missing and combined perturbations.
3.2. Effect of Non-Linear Distortion
Figure 6 (d), (e), and (f) show the effects of the non-
linear distortion. Out of all perturbation techniques in the
study, the non-linear distortion has the greatest impact on
decreasing the mean of the genuine similarity score and in-
creasing the variance for each matcher. The non-linear dis-
tortion also produces the greatest measurement uncertainty
for each matcher. Thus, it is evident that realistic levels of
non-linear distortion have a tremendous effect on lowering
the effectiveness of minutiae-based matchers. This moti-
vates further research into minutiae-based matchers or other
fingerprint matching algorithms that are more robust to non-
linear distortion, such as the recent deep learning approach
taken in [18] that performs very well on the distorted FVC
2004 Database. Alternatively, algorithms for detecting and
correcting for non-linear distortion should be developed and
incorporated into minutiae-based matchers.
3.3. Accuracy vs. Perturbation Amount
Figure 7 shows the TAR at a constant FAR of 0.01% for
each minutiae matcher. In panel (c) of Figure 7, we observe
that randomly adding spurious minutiae on its own has no
effect on the recognition accuracy of the COTS minutiae-
based matchers and very little effect for the SourceAFIS
matcher until exceeding 200% spurious minutiae. Further-
more, increasing the positional perturbation and the number
of missing minutiae has very little effect for all matchers
up to a perturbation level at which the performance drops
steeply. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 7 indicate that these
inflection points are at about 15 to 20 pixels (for 416 x 560
images) for the positional displacement and around 80% to
85% for the percentage of missing ground truth minutiae.
Panel (d) shows a similar sudden drop in recognition accu-
racy for the combined random perturbation around a com-
bined 10 pixel displacement, 40% minutiae removal, and
100% minutiae addition. Interesting to note that individu-
ally, these levels of perturbation allow for greater than 95%
accuracy, but when aggregated together produce near 0%
accuracy. Finally, (e) shows that the effect on increasing
amounts of non-linear distortion is more gradual, yet still
detrimental to recognition accuracy.
Comparing the robustness of each matcher to the in-
creasing perturbation, we see that the SourceAFIS matcher
consistently shows the greatest decline in recognition accu-
racy. The degradation in recognition performance for the
SourceAFIS matcher is also more steep compared to the
other two matchers. This suggests that the COTS minu-
tiae based matchers are relatively more robust to the in-
duced perturbations, however, we see that with enough
random positional perturbations and non-linear distortion,
these matchers also show significant performance decline.
4. Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a standardized evaluation protocol for
white-box evaluation of fingerprint minutiae-matchers. In
particular, we have computed the measurement uncertainty
of an open source and two state-of-the-art commercially
available minutiae-based matchers to various normally-
distributed random perturbations and non-linear distortion
of input minutiae feature sets. This work could be ex-
tended to evaluate additional minutiae-based matchers, such
as MCC [12]. Our results indicate that missing minutiae
and non-linear distortion to input minutiae locations may
drastically affect the similarity scores output by minutiae-
based matchers. Specifically, it was found that non-linear
distortion has the greatest effect of lowering the similar-
ity scores between an unperturbed impression and a cor-
responding perturbed impression, whereas adding spurious
minutiae had the least effect. These findings suggest that
minutiae-based matchers are relatively robust to slight posi-
tional and spurious minutiae perturbations, but weak to non-
linear distortion and random removal of minutiae. Further
study may be aimed at evaluating the effect of correlated
noise to account for non-uniformity caused by the elastic-
ity of human skin in positional displacement between the
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 7: True accept rate at a constant false accept rate of 0.01% of the three minutiae matchers vs. increasing levels of perturbation. (a) Increasing random
minutiae position displacements (in pixels), (b) increasing percentage of ground truth minutiae removed, (c) increasing percentage of ground truth minutiae
added, (d) increasing combined random noise (combined pixel displacements, missing minutiae, and spurious minutiae), and (e) increasing std. dev. values
of the non-linear distortion model.
inner and outer edge of the fingerprint impressions. The
study could also be furthered by an analysis of the effects
of fingerprint class (arch, whorl, right loop, and left loop) on
matcher uncertainty, since it has been observed that minu-
tiae distributions are class dependent [25].
References
[1] FVC2002. http://bias.csr.unibo.it/
fvc2002/. 2002.
[2] FVC2004. http://bias.csr.unibo.it/
fvc2004/. 2004.
[3] Evaluation of measurement data supplement 1 to the guide
to the expression of uncertainty in measurement propagation
of distributions using a monte carlo method. JCGM 101,
2008.
[4] S. S. Arora, K. Cao, A. K. Jain, and N. G. Paulter. Design
and fabrication of 3d fingerprint targets. IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security, 11(10):2284–2297,
Oct. 2016.
[5] S. S. Arora, A. K. Jain, and N. G. Paulter. 3d whole hand
targets: Evaluating slap and contactless fingerprint readers.
In 2016 International Conference of the Biometrics Special
Interest Group (BIOSIG), pages 1–8, Sept 2016.
[6] S. S. Arora, A. K. Jain, and N. G. Paulter. Gold fingers:
3d targets for evaluating capacitive readers. IEEE Transac-
tions on Information Forensics and Security, pages 1–1, Apr.
2017.
[7] A. M. Bazen and S. H. Gerez. Elastic minutiae matching
by means of thin-plate spline models. In Object recognition
supported by user interaction for service robots, volume 2,
pages 985–988. IEEE, 2002.
[8] A. M. Bazen and S. H. Gerez. Thin-plate spline modelling
of elastic deformations in fingerprints. In Proceedings of 3rd
IEEE Benelux Signal Processing Symposium, 2002.
[9] A. M. Bazen and S. H. Gerez. Fingerprint matching by
thin-plate spline modelling of elastic deformations. Pattern
Recognition, 36(8):1859–1867, 2003.
[10] R. Black. Managing the Testing Process: Practical Tools and
Techniques for Managing Hardware and Software Testing.
Wiley Publishing, 3rd edition, 2009.
[11] F. L. Bookstein. Principal warps: Thin-plate splines and
the decomposition of deformations. IEEE Transactions on
Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 11(6):567–585,
1989.
[12] R. Cappelli, M. Ferrara, and D. Maltoni. Minutia cylinder-
code: A new representation and matching technique for fin-
gerprint recognition. IEEE transactions on pattern analysis
and machine intelligence, 32(12):2128–2141, 2010.
[13] R. Cappelli, D. Maio, and D. Maltoni. Sfinge: an approach to
synthetic fingerprint generation. In International Workshop
on Biometric Technologies (BT2004), pages 147–154, 2004.
[14] Y. Chen, S. Dass, A. Ross, and A. Jain. Fingerprint defor-
mation models using minutiae locations and orientations. In
2005 Seventh IEEE Workshops on Applications of Computer
Vision (WACV/MOTION’05)-Volume 1, volume 1, pages
150–155. IEEE, 2005.
[15] T. Chugh, S. S. Arora, A. K. Jain, and N. G. Paulter. Bench-
marking fingerprint minutiae extractors. In 2017 Interna-
tional Conference of the Biometrics Special Interest Group
(BIOSIG), pages 1–8. IEEE, 2017.
[16] A. Dabouei, H. Kazemi, S. M. Iranmanesh, J. Dawson, and
N. M. Nasrabadi. Fingerprint distortion rectification using
deep convolutional neural networks. In 2018 International
Conference on Biometrics (ICB), pages 1–8. IEEE, 2018.
[17] J. J. Engelsma, S. S. Arora, A. K. Jain, and N. G. Paulter.
Universal 3d wearable fingerprint targets: advancing finger-
print reader evaluations. IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, 13(6):1564–1578, 2018.
[18] J. J. Engelsma, K. Cao, and A. K. Jain. Learning a fixed-
length fingerprint representation, 2019.
[19] R. A. Hicklin, B. T. Ulery, T. A. Busey, M. A. Roberts, and
J. Buscaglia. Gaze behavior and cognitive states during fin-
gerprint target group localization. Cognitive Research: Prin-
ciples and Implications, 4(1):12, 2019.
[20] D. Maltoni, D. Maio, A. K. Jain, and S. Prabhakar. Hand-
book of Fingerprint Recognition. Springer, 2nd edition,
2009.
[21] D. Peralta, M. Galar, I. Triguero, D. Paternain, S. Garcı´a,
E. Barrenechea, J. M. Benı´tez, H. Bustince, and F. Herrera.
A survey on fingerprint minutiae-based local matching for
verification and identification: Taxonomy and experimental
evaluation. Information Sciences, 315:67–87, 2015.
[22] A. Ross, S. Dass, and A. Jain. A deformable model for fin-
gerprint matching. Pattern Recognition, 38(1):95–103, 2005.
[23] A. Ross, S. C. Dass, and A. K. Jain. Estimating fingerprint
deformation. In International Conference on Biometric Au-
thentication, pages 249–255. Springer, 2004.
[24] A. Ross, S. C. Dass, and A. K. Jain. Fingerprint warping us-
ing ridge curve correspondences. IEEE Transactions on Pat-
tern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 28(1):19–30, 2005.
[25] A. Ross, J. Shah, and A. K. Jain. From template to im-
age: Reconstructing fingerprints from minutiae points. IEEE
transactions on pattern analysis and machine intelligence,
29(4):544–560, 2007.
[26] X. Si, J. Feng, J. Zhou, and Y. Luo. Detection and rectifica-
tion of distorted fingerprints. IEEE Transactions on Pattern
Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 37(3):555–568, 2015.
[27] E. Tabassi. Towards NFIQ II Lite: Self-organizing maps for
fingerprint image quality assessment. Technical report, 2014.
[28] B. T. Ulery, R. A. Hicklin, M. A. Roberts, and J. Buscaglia.
Measuring what latent fingerprint examiners consider suffi-
cient information for individualization determinations. PloS
One, 9(11):e110179, 2014.
[29] B. T. Ulery, R. A. Hicklin, M. A. Roberts, and J. Buscaglia.
Changes in latent fingerprint examiners markup between
analysis and comparison. Forensic Science International,
247:54–61, 2015.
[30] J. Unar, W. C. Seng, and A. Abbasi. A review of biometric
technology along with trends and prospects. Pattern recog-
nition, 47(8):2673–2688, 2014.
[31] R. Vazan. SourceAFIS for Java and .NET, (accessed June,
2019). https://sourceafis.machinezoo.com.
[32] C. I. Watson, G. Fiumara, E. Tabassi, S. Cheng, P. Flanagan,
and W. Salamon. Fingerprint vendor technology evaluation,
NIST Interagency/internal Report 8034: 2015. available at
https://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8034.
[33] W. Yang, J. Hu, and S. Wang. The effect of spurious and
missing minutiae on delaunay triangulation based on its ap-
plication to fingerprint authentication. In 2014 11th Interna-
tional Conference on Fuzzy Systems and Knowledge Discov-
ery (FSKD), pages 995–999. IEEE, 2014.
[34] Y. Zhang, J. Tian, X. Chen, X. Yang, and P. Shi. Fake
finger detection based on thin-plate spline distortion model.
In International Conference on Biometrics, pages 742–749.
Springer, 2007.
[35] Y. Zhu, S. C. Dass, and A. K. Jain. Statistical models for as-
sessing the individuality of fingerprints. IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security, 2(3):391–401, 2007.
